Iowa Hawkeyes Football

Lately, the Iowa Hawkeyes and head coach Kirk Ferentz have fallen on hard times.

Much of that has been due to an underachieving offense that finished 2012 ranked 113th in national scoring offense.

Many Hawk fans have called for Iowa and Ferentz to entirely scrap his pro-style schemes and systems and adopt something like what Chip Kelly has at Oregon or Urban Meyer has at Ohio State.

However, there is no need for Ferentz to switch to those in-vogue schemes. Iowa doesn't need a spread, hurry-up offense or a mobile quarterback to be successful.

What Ferentz needs to take from coaches like Meyer concerns his overall offensive philosophy, which breaks down the barriers between the offensive skill players. In other words, Meyer's approach, as footballtimes.org noted, features non-specialized positions where the ball is put in the playmaker's hands and said playmaker is given the opportunity to make plays.

Therefore, a receiver is as likely to take a handoff as make a reception. A running back is as likely to line up in the slot as in the backfield. A quarterback is as likely to run as to throw. Moreover, said quarterback is equally adept at both elements of the game.

This leaves an opposing defense unsure of who is a threat to do what, and it gives multiple playmakers opportunities to get on the field and make plays.

Conversely, Ferentz's offense is an offense of specialization.

His quarterbacks hand off or pass. His receivers run routes and catch the ball. His tailbacks line up in the backfield. His fullbacks block and rarely touch the ball. His tight ends are the most versatile players on the team, and they are limited.

Most importantly, all of Ferentz's skill-position players fit the exact mold of what he wants them to be.

Even when Ferentz breaks out of his specialized tendencies, the results are uncreative and usually unsuccessful. Iowa fans well remember the end-arounds that typified the latter part of the (former offensive coordinator) Ken O'Keefe years, which Iowa blog blackheartgoldpants poked fun at heading into the 2011 season.

14 years of Kirk Ferentz football has made all of this clear to Hawkeye fans, and it was fine in 2002, which was still the age of specialization, both in the college ranks and in the NFL.

Nowadays, even the NFL is leaving specialization behind.

Consider the New England Patriots, coached by Bill Belichick, who is not only Kirk Ferentz's old boss but also Iowa offensive line coach Brian Ferentz's former chief.

As Sports Illustrated's Peter King reported, when Brian Ferentz was coaching the Pats tight ends, New England was breaking ground, finding innovative, non-specialized uses for Ferentz's proteges.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YP50w6bo6jw

Top tight end Rob Gronkowski had an All-Pro year in 2011, recording 90 receptions for 1,327 yards and 17 touchdowns. He lined up in the backfield, in the slot, out wide and in the traditional tight end spot on the line. He even had one rush for two yards and a touchdown.

No. 2 tight end Aaron Hernandez had 79 catches for 910 yards and seven touchdowns. He added five rushes for 45 yards. He also lined up all over the field.

The 2011 OC for the Pats, Bill O'Brien, became the head coach of Penn State in 2012 and he brought New England's innovative schemes with him to State College.

Four different Penn State tight ends made receptions in 2012, two of them freshmen. Tight ends accounted for three of PSU's top five pass catchers. Nittany Lion tight ends made over 30 percent of the Penn State receptions, over 33 percent of the yardage and almost 42 percent of the receiving touchdowns.

Finally, as Hawkeye fans that witnessed the drubbing PSU laid on Iowa midway through the season know, the Penn State tight ends lined up all over the field and ran different types of routes, constantly exploiting mismatches.

Meanwhile, what did the team that has the former Patriot tight end coach do?

As Susan Denk of thehawkeye.com noted, it took until the final two games of the season for Iowa to show "it still [had] tight ends on its roster."

In those two games, junior tight end C.J. Fiedorowicz caught 14 passes for 155 yards. That was over 31 percent of his catches on the year and over 35 percent of his yardage. Following the Michigan game, Mike Hlas of the Cedar Rapids Gazette tweeted:

RT @tomfornelli Greg Davis just discovered CJ Fiedorowicz in practice this week.

— Mike Hlas (@Hlas) November 17, 2012

This was despite OC Greg Davis singing Fiedorowicz's praises throughout the preseason, as he did in this CBS Sports article.

Along with Fiedorowicz, redshirt freshman tight end Henry Krieger Coble recorded four catches for 30 yards over the final two games—his only catches on the season.

One can deduce the reason the tight ends failed to show up for much of the year was because the Hawkeye offensive brain trust failed to get creative and utilize the talent it had.

This lack of offensive creativity and failure to put playmakers on the field in whatever role facilitates their ability to make plays could've been at issue in the recent transfer of freshman running back Greg Garmon.

According to Rob Howe of Scout.com, Garmon left the Hawks because "it wasn't a fit" for him, which, according to the article, was a sentiment Ferentz shared.

Garmon came to the Hawkeyes as Rivals' No. 19 running back in the country and Scout's No. 15. He had offers from Florida State, Michigan, Ohio State, Penn State, Tennessee and Texas A&M, among others.

Iowa fans would have to go back pretty far to find the last time the Hawkeyes beat out the Buckeyes and Wolverines on the recruiting trail. They'd probably have to go back before Ferentz to find the last time the Hawks beat out those teams for a skill-position player.

It is true that recruiting rankings don't always pan out, but as Matt Hinton of Yahoo! Sports found out, more often than not, they do.

With that in mind, what did Garmon and Ferentz mean when they said Iowa was a bad "fit"?

More than likely, it meant that Garmon was not the type of between-the-tackles runner that Kirk Ferentz prefers. This is also the type of back preferred by Wisconsin, Michigan State and Nebraska.

With a listed (and as the picture below testifies, an inflated) height and weight of 6'1", 200 pounds, Garmon is a finesse runner. His skills would be best utilized by getting him into space and allowing him to outrun defenders.

On the other hand, unlike Iowa, Wisconsin, MSU and Nebraska have had finesse runners on their rosters and found ways to get them onto the playing field and make plays.

Wisconsin's James White is not cut from the same mold as former and current Badger bruisers Montee Ball, John Clay and P.J. Hill. Unlike those players, whose average weight was 235 pounds, White weighs in at 197 pounds. Yet, the Badgers have found ways to get him onto the field and put the ball in his hands.

In three seasons, White has put up 2,571 yards rushing to go along with 370 yards receiving. And he has yet to start a game as a Badger.

Under Bo Pelini, the Cornhuskers have had two feature backs over the last five years. One of them was 220-pound Roy Helu Jr., and the other was 210-pound Rex Burkhead. Both Helu and Burkhead were between-the-tackles runners.

Nonetheless, in 2012 Pelini and the offensive coaches found a way to get the ball into the hands of 185-pound scatback Ameer Abdullah. He responded with an 1,137-yard season.

In Iowa City, Garmon played as a true freshman and averaged 3.21 yards per carry on 38 rushing attempts. One would think Garmon's mediocre performance is evidence that his recruiting rankings were inaccurate.

However, the bigger issue was that the coaches asked him to run the same plays that Hawkeye bruisers such as Mark Weisman, Marcus Coker and Shonn Greene (average weight: 235 pounds) ran—between the tackles.

It goes without saying that Garmon was unsuccessful. He is the type of running back that benefits from sweeps, pitches and plays that allow him to use his speed to outrun the other team.

This is not to suggest that Iowa should overhaul its running game. Rather, it further illustrates that Ferentz's lack of flexibility and tendency towards specialization put Garmon in a position where he was made to feel Iowa was a bad "fit."

It is more than likely that Wisconsin, despite running a power-based scheme, would not have seemed like the same bad "fit."

Looking towards next year, Iowa will have to do better than the 19.3 points per game it put up in 2012 if it wants to achieve bowl eligibility, let alone a more ambitious record.

Contrary to what some fans believe, there is plenty of offensive talent on the roster.

Iowa has two former 4-star tight ends—Fiedorowicz and Ray Hamilton—on its roster. It also has Krieger Coble and Jake Duzey, a 3-star tight end who chose Iowa over offers from Oregon and Michigan State.

If all of the running backs stay in Iowa City and avoid health, legal and academic issues, the Hawkeyes will have Weisman along with junior Damon Bullock and sophomore Jordan Canzeri in the backfield.

These are all playmakers who need to be put in the best position possible to make plays, even if that "position" doesn't correspond with Kirk Ferentz's specialized idea of where these players should be.

If that means playing Bullock or Canzeri as hybrid running back/slot receivers, then so be it. If that means using Duzey as an H-back rather than a traditional tight end, then that is how it should be. If that means lining Fiedorowicz in the slot in order to put his 6'7" frame in a mismatch against a 5'11" cornerback, then that is what Iowa and Kirk Ferentz need to do.

This is not a scheme overhaul. This is using players in non-specialized roles to best take advantage of their unique talents.

It is certainly what Urban Meyer would do.

After the Iowa Hawkeyes finished the 2012 season with a 4-8 record, many fans found themselves standing on one side of the fence or the other.

Kirk Ferentz has been at Iowa 14 seasons. He has won two (co) Big Ten championships, been to two BCS bowls, become bowl eligible 10 of his 14 seasons and is the second-winningest coach in Iowa football history.

That's not too shabby, and some fans feel that he has more than earned his keep. On the other hand, other fans feel that it is not good enough, especially given his $3.835 million per year salary, which, according to Chris Smith of Forbes Magazine, makes him the fifth-most powerful coach in college football.

But is it good enough? For that matter, what is "good enough"?

Ultimately, there are four possible camps into which any given Iowa fan might fit.

In Kirk We Trust

The In-Kirk-We-Trust camp feels that Ferentz has earned his money, and they have no problem with his overall job performance.

Certainly, they're upset with this season's performance—who wouldn't be?—but when one looks at Ferentz's career from a larger perspective, one can't help but be impressed, especially when comparing his resume to past Iowa coaches.

Their primary support concerns the coaches between Forest Evashevski and Hayden Fry.

Specifically, Jerry Burns went 16-27-2 in five seasons. Ray Nagel went 16-32-2 in five seasons. Frank Lauterbur went 4-28-1 in three seasons. Lastly, Bob Commings went 18-37 in five seasons.

Ferentz has gone 100-75 in 14 years. He has maintained the level of consistency that Fry brought to Iowa City. A large portion of the current fanbase weren't alive during the '60s and '70s, but returning to that mess could be as easy as one bad coaching hire.

Lil Old Iowa

The group from this camp does not feel that 2012 was acceptable. However, in the larger picture, they have no problem with the job Ferentz has done.

The thinking of this group is that the Hawkeyes should make a bowl every season and contend for a Big Ten title once a recruiting cycle (every four-five years). On the other hand, asking for or expecting more than that is unrealistic, given the inherent recruiting disadvantages that Iowa faces, as Rivals' Dallas Jackson pointed out in 2011.

This is called the "Lil Old Iowa" group because the basic mentality is that "lil old Iowa" cannot consistently compete on the recruiting trails—and therefore, on the gridirons—with the likes of Ohio State, Notre Dame, Florida or Texas.

Some might automatically discount this camp but consider the schools that share Iowa's situation: programs that exist in non-flashy locales and are not only in talent-poor states but don't even border any of the most talent-rich states.

In short, the only modern program in such a situation that has lifted itself into the upper echelon of college football has been Nebraska. Moreover, as is evident from the last decade or so, the Huskers are having a tough time maintaining that level of prestige—certainly tougher than a program like Florida, which, despite having four different head coaches over the last 12 years, is still elite.

In short, can Iowa play with the big boys? Yes, but it is asking a lot.

Seven Wins Minimum

This group is the bunch that got vocal following 2012. They were disappointed about 2010 and would have liked that 2011 loss to Minnesota back, but they still recognized all that Ferentz had accomplished.

Nonetheless, this camp considers 2012 a fiasco, and that fiasco has finally sent them over the edge.

They are aware of the aforementioned disadvantages Iowa faces and do not regularly expect the Hawkeyes to challenge for national titles.

On the other hand, in this age of one-FCS-opponent-per-year to go along with at least one—if not two—should-be MAC-rifices, seven wins should be the minimum for a tenured coach. Furthermore, that seven-win season should be limited to once per recruiting cycle.

Iowa should be in the hunt for the Big Ten championship more often than not, and once per recruiting cycle, it should be in the national title talk.

The advantage of signing a coach to a 10-year contract—regardless of the price tag involved—is consistency. This is not consistency of the win-loss variety but a selling point that Iowa can use on the recruiting trails in order to offset the aforementioned disadvantages it faces.

Therefore, while Florida or Notre Dame is in the process of breaking in yet another coach, Ferentz can come in and say, "I'm not going anywhere," and his contract will back that up.

This consistency should not only allow the Hawkeyes to bring in better recruits than it otherwise might, but it also should allow the Hawks to face less attrition than other programs and do a better job in developing players within Ferentz's system.

Unfortunately, as detailed by Iowa blog Blackheartgoldpants, Hawkcentral's Pat Harty, Jon Miller of Hawkeyenation and even me, Ferentz's consistency has not kept players on campus.

As those writers detailed, attrition, as much as anything, has led to this year's 4-8 record. Consequently, the seven-win-minimum camp is left to ask exactly what Ferentz is doing?

$3,835,000

Most Iowa fans recognize that figure as quickly as they recognize their starting quarterback's jersey number. It is Kirk Ferentz's yearly salary, and according to USA Today, as of mid-November, it made him the sixth-highest paid head coach in college football (that list is already slightly outdated, but Ferentz is still No. 6).

The camp that is hung up on this number believes that Iowa should regularly begin the year in the top 10, should always be in hunt for the Big Ten championship and should regularly be in national title talk. Eight wins is the bare minimum, and that should only follow three years in a row of triple-digit wins.

Needless to say, this group has been vocal for a while.

This might seem far-fetched—again, the inherent recruiting disadvantages still apply even if one believes Ferentz should overcome them.

However, consider the others in Ferentz's salary range (i.e. the top 10 as of mid-November): Nick Saban, Mack Brown, Bob Stoops, Urban Meyer, Les Miles, Ferentz, Gene Chizik, Chip Kelly and Gary Patterson.

A week after that list was published, Chizik was fired (per ESPN).

Kelly and Patterson, along with Ferentz, are the only ones who haven't won a national championship, but Kelly has been to one BCS National Championship Game, won PAC-10/12 championships in three of the four years he's been in Eugene and is one of the top five winningest coaches in college football since 2009.

Meanwhile, Patterson is in a unique situation, as his Horned Frogs have not been in a BCS conference during most of his time in Fort Worth. Nonetheless, TCU is also amongst the top five winningest programs since he became the Horned Frogs' top man in 2000.

And where is Ferentz since he came to Iowa City in 1999? He is No. 37, a number that will drop soon, as the site used to generate these numbers has not added 2012 yet.

Consequently, if the situation is looked at economically, it's not at all ridiculous that Iowa should stand with the likes of Alabama, Ohio State and Southern Cal at top of college football pantheon.

The Fallout

In the end, all of the camps can put up reasonable arguments. So what is it Hawkeye fans? Which camp do the majority fall into?

Has Ferentz done an adequate job, more-than-adequate, unacceptable, deplorable?

Whatever the answer, if next season is anything like this one, he can expect the "Lil, Old Iowa" fans to start chirping up as well, and then, he could be in real trouble.

With all the talk of Iowa's offensive problems, the defense has gone under the radar.

It is true that statistically, the defense, which was the No. 7 scoring D in the Big Ten, did better than expected (which, in itself, is sad). However, those that watched the Big Ten season know that when Mother Nature wasn't helping out, the Hawkeye defense fell apart down the conference stretch.

The question is, how much of that was due to youth and how much of it was due to scheme?

The Kirk Ferentz defense is simplicity at its finest.

It operates with the mentality that at the college level, most offenses and specifically most quarterbacks cannot consistently put together 10-plus play drives and methodically move down the field.

In effect, the goal of the Hawkeye defense is to take away the run, force the pass, not allow the receiver to go anywhere after the catch and absolutely, under all circumstances, never allow the big play.

The thinking is that sooner or later, the offense will get impatient or shoot itself in the foot, and when they do, the Iowa defense will be there to pounce.

This is called the bend-don't-break philosophy, and in its best years, it has had great success. Consider 2003-04 and 2008-2009, the unquestioned high point of the Ferentz-era defenses. Also, not coincidentally, those were four of Ferentz's best five years as a Hawkeye; Ferentz is a decidedly defense-dominant coach.

The question, therefore, is what of those years when it doesn't work so well. What is the issue in those situations?

One first has to consider the personnel that Ferentz's defense needs to to run the bend-don't-break effectively.

It starts up front with the defensive line. The front four have to be able to control the line of scrimmage and take blockers out of the play, so that the linebackers can stay clean and make plays. It also has to create a pass rush without the help of blitzing. Finally, it needs to contain and mobilize dual-threat quarterbacks without the help of a spying linebacker or safety.

In other words, a good Iowa defense needs a really good, experienced, technically proficient defensive line.

The linebackers do not have to be dangerous blitzers. They do need to be effective tacklers and have a nose for the ball. This is especially true of the middle linebacker, or MIKE in the Hawkeyes' lexicon.

The outside linebackers don't have to be as adept at finding the ball, but they do have to be exceptional—for a linebacker—in coverage. The reason is that Ferentz doesn't like to sub in extra defensive backs, and outside linebackers can expect to cover not only tight ends and running backs but even slot receivers.

In effect, the majority of the pressure is put on the front seven, but the secondary is not without key responsibilities.

As with linebackers being exceptional in coverage, the defensive backs need to be exceptional—for defensive backs—in run support. They need to be solid, fundamental wrap-up tacklers. The Iowa D does not break when it allows a reception. It does break when it allows yards after the catch.

It is no surprise that half of the Iowa cornerbacks that have gone on to the NFL have become safeties as pros. As often as not, Hawkeye cornerbacks are glorified safeties with a safeties' responsibilities.

The big rule for Iowa defensive backs is that absolutely nobody can get behind the secondary.

In years when the defense has not flourished, one of two things have broken down: either Ferentz didn't have the necessary personnel to run his scheme, or the opposing offenses were custom-made to beat the bend-don't-break.

Beginning with the first possibility, consider the successful years.

In 2003, six of the 11 starters were drafted with one going in the first round and two in the second. One went on to become 2008's NFL Defensive Player of the Year. Most of those six draftees have had careers lasting three years or more. One other starter was too short to be successful in the NFL, but is the Canadian Football League's reigning Defensive Player of the Year. 

Of the 2004 defense, five were drafted. Two went the free-agent route and have enjoyed enduring NFL careers. Finally, the aforementioned CFL Defensive Player of the Year was also on the 2004 D.

The 2008 defense had seven starting draftees with one going in the first round. Two signed as free agents, and have enjoyed a sustained career in the NFL (though one of those free agents did move to the offensive line as a pro).

Eight starters and one key reserve from the 2009 defense were drafted. That is a total of nine. If Hawkeye fans want to know what it was like to be an Ohio State fan under Jim Tressel or a Bama fan under Nick Saban, remember the talent on that 2009 defense. It is like that for Crimson Tide fans every year.

Compare those seasons with a relative down-year like 2011.

Four players from the 2011 defense were (or will be) drafted, with none going above the fourth round (though Micah Hyde, who was a cornerback on the 2011 squad, is projected to go in the third). When all is said and done, that total may rise to six, but the two potential draftees—both linebackers—that are set to graduate next year were young in 2011 and have not yet played at a level where they can expect to get drafted.

In short, it is unfair to expect the 2011 squad to have been able to do what the 2009 squad regularly did.

Then consider the second part of the equation: facing opposing offenses that are custom-made to beat the bend-don't-break.

This was most evident in 2010. That squad had plenty of talent. Seven players were drafted with one going in the first round. Also, one linebacker, who missed most of the season with injuries, went the free-agent route, and has remained on the New England Patriots' active roster for two seasons.

The problem was the teams that it played featured patient, experienced, accurate quarterbacks that played on offenses with the ability to sustain drives.

Four of Iowa's losses came against teams that averaged a 68.2 completion percentage. They were custom-made to beat the Hawks.

Now consider the bigger picture, and specifically the Big Ten during the glory years: 2001-2004. Those four years comprised the best four-year run for Ferentz.

Only one Big Ten team completed more than 62 percent of its passes during those years: 2001 Iowa. Moreover, only six teams completed over 60 percent of their passes.

This is in comparison to 2008-2011, which, all things considered, was a decent run for Ferentz. During those years, 13 Big Ten teams completed over 62 percent of their passes, 18 conference teams completed over 60 percent of their passes and three completed over 70 percent.

And this was the Big Ten.

Over half of the offense-dominant Big 12 has completed over 60 percent of its passes for the past three seasons. The same can be said for the Pac-12 (formerly Pac-10).

Modern (i.e. post-2008) offenses are geared to complete more passes and move the ball faster. In other words, they are built to beat bend-don't-break defenses, because they do exactly what Kirk Ferentz bets they can't do—consistently, methodically and quickly move the ball down the field.

In a way, it turns the tables on the bend-don't-break defense, because it makes it so that the D has to play mistake-free in order to contain the opposing offense.

Some of the seasons used as examples are outliers. The 2010 Big Ten was a strong conference dominated by experienced, accurate quarterbacks. That strong a conference was a once-in-a-decade scenario.

Furthermore, the 2012 Iowa defense was particularly bad. In effect, whatever defensive scheme Ferentz employs, it is unlikely his defense will be that bad for a long while.

In closing, numbers often don't tell the whole story, but numbers never lie.

Kirk Ferentz likes to win with his defense, but if his defense is to be as successful as it has been in the past, he will have to make some adjustments.

His base defense can still employ a bend-don't-break philosophy, and in seasons where he has personnel similar to 2009 or 2004—and where he doesn't face a slate of offenses like 2010—he can sit back and allow his conservative D to take care of business.

On the other hand, when he finds himself with an undersized, inexperienced, lightly recruited defensive line to go along with a pair of walk-on safeties, and he expects them to go up against an offense that regularly completes over 65 percent of its passes, he had better make some adjustments.

In a recent press conference (via Hawkeyereport.com), Kirk Ferentz was asked what he thought about recruiting junior college (JUCO) players.

He replied:

"I'm going off my history at this school, junior college players don't, as a rule, always transition in as well. That hasn't been our mode. But there are some schools where it's probably more workable."

Some Hawkeye JUCO-transfers who would disagree with that statement include Brad Banks, C.J. Jones and Marshal Yanda.

It is true that for every Brad Banks and Marshal Yanda, there is a Dan Heiar or Nathan Guillory—JUCO transfers who didn't work out at Iowa, and, in fact, never took a snap in a Hawkeye uniform.

However, if the success rate of JUCO transfers who realized their talents at Iowa is approximately 50 percent—a conservative estimate—then, to use Ferentz's own words, "as a rule", that probably makes their fortunes about equivalent to the average Iowa high-school recruit.

Iowa is in a unique situation in comparison to many other BCS programs. Iowa is considered a talent-poor state. A recent Rivals' survey that detailed which states have the most high school talent per capita showed that Iowa was in the bottom 10 in the country with one Division I recruit for every 2,161 players.

The only other states in the bottom 10 that were also homes to BCS programs were West Virginia and Minnesota. Iowa was the only state in the bottom 10 that was home to two BCS programs.

The survey only took into consideration the 2011 recruiting season, but it is fair to assume that even in the best of years, Iowa will not break into the top half of talent-producing states.

In effect, when one looks at a number of the schools that have a somewhat similar situation to Iowa—West Virginia, the Kansas schools and Nebraska in particular—one notices that said schools go heavy on JUCO recruits.

Between the 2011 and 2012 recruiting classes, West Virginia brought in three JUCOs. Nebraska also brought in three. Kansas brought in nine, while K-State brought in 16.

By the way, Iowa State—the fellow Hawkeye-State program that has beaten Iowa two years in a row—brought in six JUCOs in those years. One of them—quarterback Steele Jantz—made the Hawks look stupid in 2011, and another—receiver Aaron Horne—has caught 10 passes for 167 yards and one touchdown over the two rivalry match-ups.

The reason programs such as these thrive on JUCO players is because it is easier to get high-level JUCO talent to commit to play in less desirable locations than it is to get high-level high school talent to leave home or play in a seemingly unexciting (and relatively cold) locale such as Manhattan, Kansas or Iowa City, Iowa.

With this in mind, the Hawkeyes had a terrible 2012. Kirk Ferentz wouldn't call it the low point of his career—he'd save that for 2006—but a record of 4-8 can never be considered a successful year.

Part of the reason Iowa had such a poor season had to do with not having the players it needed at certain positions—most notably on the defensive line and at wide receiver.

Looking forward, the Hawkeyes should be a better team in 2013. Nevertheless, given the schemes that Iowa wants to run, especially on defense, there is still a glaring deficiency at defensive end.

In Ferentz's schemes, Iowa needs athletic defensive ends who can maintain leverage on the edges, contain the quarterback and are able to consistently pressure the passer. That is easier said than done and requires top-notch athletes.

In fact, though Iowa is known for developing unheralded recruits, most of its top defensive ends over the last 14 years have been highly touted prospects. Specifically, Aaron Kampman, Matt Roth, Adrian Clayborn and Christian Ballard were all heavily recruited out of high school.

The only two high-impact Iowa defensive ends during the Ferentz era that have not been highly recruited were Broderick Binns and Howard Hodges. However, neither of them could be said to be in Roth's or Clayborn's strata in terms of impact.

Looking towards next year, the defensive end position still doesn't look especially promising.

Dominic Alvis, a two-year starter, will return for his senior year. Alvis is a smart player who has proven to be staunch against the run. He has shown an ability to contain or rush the passer, but has yet to demonstrate an ability to do both. In 21 starts thus far in his career, he has totaled 4.5 sacks.

The other defensive end spot will likely go to true-sophomore Drew Ott—who burned his redshirt eight games into the season—or possibly one of a bevy of young defensive tackles, provided they show the ability to move outside. Also, redshirt sophomores Riley McMinn and Melvin Spears will be in the mix.

Scout named Ott a two-star recruit, while Rivals listed him with three. His only other FBS offers were from Kansas State and Ohio. Unless Ott—or one of the other sophomore options—turns into Ferentz's first non-highly recruited high-impact defensive end, it is unlikely the Hawkeyes will have the ends they need to run the system they want.

Meanwhile, three of the best JUCO ends in the 2013 recruiting class—Mississippi's Andrew Bolton,  Arizona's Randy Gregory and Iowa's Rodney Coe—have already given verbal commitments to Kansas, Nebraska and Iowa State, respectively.

Incidentally, Iowa did offer Gregory and Bolton scholarships. Furthermore, Coe originally committed to the Hawkeyes out of high school, but his grades weren't acceptable. He still might have ended up in Iowa City if not for some February tweets (per Iowa blog Blackheartgoldpants) that spiraled out of control.

As JCFootball.com notes, there are still plenty of uncommitted JUCO defensive end recruits out there, but has Iowa offered any scholarships to them?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOhz_FsVA4k

Nope.

In the end, if Kirk Ferentz feels that the JUCO route isn't the route for his program, then that is his decision. Nonetheless, the Iowa defense is not built to blitz or put too much pressure on the secondary.

In effect, unless Ott (or whoever winds up at defensive end) is much better than expected, plays such as the attached play against Michigan (at the 4:56 mark) could very well happen with regularity in 2013.

Bowl bids will be chosen and announced following this weekend's conference championship games.

However, the Iowa Hawkeyes will be staying home this holiday season.

This is despite a soft schedule that saw Iowa miss Wisconsin (7-5) and Ohio State (12-0) in conference play. Its toughest out-of-conference foe was 6-6 Iowa State.

Kirk Ferentz likes to cite "execution" as the typical reason for the Hawks failures, and he's correct.

As anybody that watched Iowa in 2012 knows, the team wasn't good. This manifested itself in dropped passes, missed tackles, blown coverages, bad penalties, poor quarterback play and missed blocking assignments.

Nevertheless, if the measure of a coach is how well he prepares his players and puts them in a position to win, then Kirk Ferentz, in his 14th year at Iowa, could be said to have failed miserably at executing his job.

It's true that the Hawkeyes came into the season inexperienced at a number of positions, as well as lacking talent and size at others, but they did have enough of all of these things to have done better than 4-8. This is especially true when one considers that four of their losses were to teams with six wins or less.

One might argue that Iowa was "out-talented" against Michigan and Nebraska, but all of the other opponents on their schedule were beatable. Nevertheless, the Hawkeyes kept failing to show up, looked unprepared and eventually lost due to a bevy of mental errors.

There have been mental errors made this season and over the last few years. These chronic mental errors are entirely on the coaching.

The two-minute offense and clock management issues have gotten to a point where Hawkeye fans almost accept it as Ferentz-being-Ferentz, as though the issues are unfixable. One is left to wonder if Ferentz doesn't realize they are problems or if he has taken any steps to fix them. It is difficult to envision any other reasons for these repeated failures.

Meanwhile, against Nebraska, other notable mental errors included pooch-punter John Wienke punting the ball into the end zone with no return man back. Additionally, Iowa recorded its second offensive penalty of the season after coming out of a timeout: The penalty was for having 12 men in the huddle.

These were just a couple of mental errors in a game full of mental errors in a season full of mental errors.

And mental errors are all correctable and are all on the coach. Especially when they happen over and over and over again.

Close games are decided by one or two plays and are won by superior coaches. Coaches who have their players ready to win the close games are the best coaches. Xs and Os and talent matter, but execution wins ball games and key execution comes down to how well a coach has his players ready.

Since 2005, Kirk Ferentz's record in games decided by a touchdown or less is 14-24.

Even worse, amongst those 14 wins include close (seven points or less) victories over 2006 Syracuse (4-8), 2007 Minnesota (1-11), 2008 Purdue (4-8), 2009 Arkansas State (4-8), 2009 Northern Iowa (FCS), 2009 Michigan (5-7) and 2010 Indiana (5-7).

In other words, eight of Iowa's "close" wins have been against teams that were hardly setting gridirons on fire.

And Iowa's struggles against overmatched foes have been well-documented by the likes of Mike Hlas of the Cedar Rapids Gazette.

Most of those losses featured the mental errors that have become commonplace, though the mistakes this year were particularly awful.

Outliers happen, but when mistakes repeat themselves not only over the course of a season but over the course of a career, it becomes evident that the coach isn't preparing his players. In other words, he's not executing.

In the end, Iowa isn't going bowling, but it's not because the players failed to execute.

The failure to execute belongs to the coaches, and thus, to Kirk Ferentz.